


Succinct Arguments

Lecture 08: Polynomial Commitments from Bilinear Groups

Polynomial Commitments

Recall: Polynomial Commitments



- **Completeness:** Whenever $p(z) = v$, **R** accepts.
- **Extractability:** Whenever **R** accepts, **S**'s commitment **cm** “contains” a polynomial p of degree at most D .
- **Hiding:** **cm** and π reveal *no* information about p other than v

Recall:

Cryptographic Groups

Cyclic Group

A set $\mathbb{G} := \{1, g, g^2, \dots, g^{p-2}\}$

- g is the generator of \mathbb{G}
- p is the *order* of \mathbb{G}
- DL: Given an arbitrary $h = g^x$, it is difficult to compute x

Warmup:

Improved Pedersen-based Commitment Scheme

Recall: Pedersen Commitments

$\text{Setup}(n \in \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow \text{ck}$

1. Sample random elements $g_1, \dots, g_n, h \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$

$\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, m \in \mathbb{F}_p^n; r \in \mathbb{F}_p) \rightarrow \text{cm}$

1. Output $\text{cm} := g_1^{m_1} g_2^{m_2} \dots g_n^{m_n} h^r$

Binding: from DL

Hiding: output is uniformly distributed

Additive: given comms to m_1, m_2 , can get comm to $\alpha m_1 + \beta m_2$

Recall: PC scheme from Pedersen Comms

$\text{Setup}(d \in \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow (\text{ck}, \text{rk})$

1. $\text{ck} \leftarrow \text{Ped} . \text{Setup}(d + 1)$. Output $(\text{ck}, \text{rk}) = (\text{ck}, \text{ck})$.

$\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, p \in \mathbb{F}_p^{d+1}; r \in \mathbb{F}_p) \rightarrow \text{cm}$

1. Output $\text{cm} := \text{Ped} . \text{Commit}(\text{ck}, p; r)$

$\text{Open}(\text{ck}, p, z \in \mathbb{F}_p; r) \rightarrow (\pi, v)$

1. Output $(\pi := (p, r), v := p(z))$

$\text{Check}(\text{rk}, \text{cm}, z, v, \pi) \rightarrow b \in \{0, 1\}$

1. Check $\text{cm} = \text{Ped} . \text{Commit}(\text{ck}, p; r)$ and $p(z) = v$.

Better PC scheme from Pedersen Comms?

$\text{Setup}(d \in \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow (\text{ck}, \text{rk})$

1. $\text{ck} \leftarrow \text{Ped} . \text{Setup}(d + 1)$. Output $(\text{ck}, \text{rk}) = (\text{ck}, \text{ck})$.

$\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, p \in \mathbb{F}_p^{d+1}; r \in \mathbb{F}_p) \rightarrow \text{cm}$

1. Output $\text{cm} := \text{Ped} . \text{Commit}(\text{ck}, p; r)$

$\text{Open}(\text{ck}, p, z \in \mathbb{F}_p; r) \rightarrow (\pi, v)$

1. ???

$\text{Check}(\text{rk}, \text{cm}, z, v, \pi) \rightarrow b \in \{0,1\}$


1. ???

Can we use PIOPs to design PC schemes?


Goal: Want to prove evaluation of $f(X)$ at point z

- We want to show that $f(z) = v$.
 - Equivalently, $f(z) - v = 0$
 - Does this remind you of something?

Recall: ZeroCheck PIOP



Key Idea: Committed ZeroCheck



We set $H := \{z\}$. Vanishing poly $v_H(X) = X - z$.

Are we done?

No! We're actually worse off:
we need to give evaluation proofs for f and q !

**Idea: What if we hid τ in
the exponent?**

Warmup 2: Trusted-Setup Pedersen-based PC

Trusted Setup Pedersen Commitments

$\text{Setup}(n \in \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow \text{ck}$

~~1. Sample random elements $g_0, \dots, g_n, h \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$~~

1. Sample $\tau \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p$. Output $\text{ck} := (g, g^\tau, g^{\tau^2}, \dots, g^{\tau^{n-1}}, h)$

$\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, m \in \mathbb{F}_p^n; r \in \mathbb{F}_p) \rightarrow \text{cm}$

1. Output $\text{cm} := g^{m_1} g^{\tau \cdot m_2} \dots g^{\tau^{n-1} \cdot m_n} h^r$

Binding: from SDH (assumption related to Computational Diffie—Hellman)

Hiding: output is uniformly distributed

Additive: given comms to m_1, m_2 , can get comm to $\alpha m_1 + \beta m_2$

Trusted Setup Pedersen PC

$\text{Setup}(d \in \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow (\text{ck}, \text{rk})$

1. $\text{ck} \leftarrow \text{Ped} . \text{Setup}(d + 1)$. Output $(\text{ck}, \text{rk}) = (\text{ck}, \text{ck})$.

$\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, p \in \mathbb{F}_p^{d+1}; r \in \mathbb{F}_p) \rightarrow \text{cm}$

1. Output $\text{cm} := \text{Ped} . \text{Commit}(\text{ck}, p; r) = g^{p(\tau)} h^r$


$\text{Open}(\text{ck}, p, z \in \mathbb{F}_p; r) \rightarrow (\pi, v)$

1. ???

$\text{Check}(\text{rk}, \text{cm}, z, v, \pi) \rightarrow b \in \{0, 1\}$

1. ???

Key Idea: Committed ZeroCheck



We have evaluations at τ in the exponent.

Need to check $f(\tau) - z = q(\tau) \cdot v_H(\tau)$.

How to multiply evaluations and check equality?

Groups allow addition in the exponent

$$g^x \cdot g^y = g^{x+y}$$

How to get multiplication?

We want operation
op such that

$$\text{op}(g^x, g^y) = g^{xy}$$

Unfortunately we don't know of any
such group + operation combinations

Bilinear Groups/ Pairing-friendly Groups

Bilinear groups

- $(p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$
 - \mathbb{G} is called the base group
 - \mathbb{G}_T is called the target group
 - Both have same prime order p , but are *different* groups!
 - \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T are both multiplicative cyclic groups of order p ,
 - g is the generator of \mathbb{G} .
 - $e(g^x, g^y) : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is called a *pairing*
 - Bilinear: $e(g^x, g^y) = e(g, g^{xy}) = e(g^{xy}, g) = e(g, g)^{xy}$

Kate-Zaverucha-Goldberg Commitment Scheme

KZG Polynomial Commitment

Setup($d \in \mathbb{N}$) \rightarrow (ck, rk)

1. $\text{ck} \leftarrow \text{Ped} . \text{Setup}(d + 1)$. Output $(\text{ck}, \text{rk}) = (\text{ck}, (g, g^\tau))$.

Commit($\text{ck}, f \in \mathbb{F}_p^{d+1}$) \rightarrow cm

1. Output $\text{cm} := \text{Ped} . \text{Commit}(\text{ck}, f) = g^{f(\tau)}$

Open($\text{ck}, f, z \in \mathbb{F}_p$) \rightarrow (π, v)

1. Output $(\pi, v) := (\text{Ped} . \text{Commit}(\text{ck}, q(X) := \frac{f(X)}{X - z}) = g^{q(\tau)}$

Check($\text{rk}, \text{cm}, z, v, \pi$) $\rightarrow b \in \{0, 1\}$

1. ???

KZG Polynomial Commitment

Setup($d \in \mathbb{N}$) \rightarrow (ck, rk)

1. $\text{ck} \leftarrow \text{Ped}.\text{Setup}(d + 1)$. Output $(\text{ck}, \text{rk}) = (\text{ck}, (g, g^\tau))$.

Commit(ck, $f \in \mathbb{F}_p^{d+1}$) \rightarrow cm

1. Output $\text{cm} := \text{Ped}.\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, f) = g^{f(\tau)}$

Open(ck, $f, z \in \mathbb{F}_p$) \rightarrow (π, v)

1. Output $(\pi, v) := (\text{Ped}.\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, q(X) := \frac{f(X)}{X - z}) = g^{q(\tau)}$

Check(rk, cm, z, v, π) $\rightarrow b \in \{0, 1\}$

1. Check $e(\text{cm} \cdot g^{-v}, g) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\pi, g^{\tau-z})$

Completeness

$\text{Check}(\text{rk}, \text{cm}, z, v, \pi) \rightarrow b \in \{0,1\}$

1. Check $e(\text{cm} \cdot g^{-v}, g) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\pi, g^{\tau-z})$

If Sender is honest, then we can rewrite the check as follows:

$$e(\text{cm} \cdot g^{-v}, g) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\pi, g^{\tau-z})$$

$$e(g^{f(\tau)-v}, g) \stackrel{?}{=} e(g^{q(\tau)}, g^{\tau-z})$$

$$e(g, g)^{f(\tau)-v} \stackrel{?}{=} e(g, g)^{q(\tau) \cdot (\tau-z)}$$

$$e(g, g)^{f(\tau)-v} \stackrel{?}{=} e(g, g)^{\frac{f(\tau)-v}{\tau-z} \cdot (\tau-z)}$$

$$e(g, g)^{f(\tau)-v} \stackrel{?}{=} e(g, g)^{f(\tau)-v}$$

Knowledge Soundness

- **Goal:** We want adv. sender \mathcal{A} to be able to produce a valid proof only if it knows f such that cm_f .
- **Intuition:**
 - Assume $f(z) \neq v$.
 - Then $q(X) = \frac{f(X) - v}{X - z}$ is a *rational* function, and not a polynomial.
 - Remember that \mathbb{G} only allows additions in the exponent, not multiplications or divisions (without pairing)
 - So \mathcal{A} can't produce commitment to $q(X)$
- **Formalized** via a proof in the **Generic Group Model**
 - GGM says that whenever \mathcal{A} produces a group element, it must provide an explanation in terms of linear combination of previous group elements.

KZG Demo

“Type-3” Bilinear groups

- $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, g, \mathbb{G}_2, h, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$
 - \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 are called the base groups
 - \mathbb{G}_T is called the target group
 - $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T$ are all multiplicative cyclic groups of order p ,
 - g is the generator of \mathbb{G}_1 , h is the generator of \mathbb{G}_2 .
 - $e(g^x, h^y) : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is called a *pairing*
 - Bilinear: $e(g^x, h^y) = e(g, h^{xy}) = e(g^{xy}, h) = e(g, h)^{xy}$